Ngai Tahu Properties Ltd v Central Plains Water by Budd, Richard
LINCOLN UNIVERSITY PLANNING REVIEW                                 VOLUME 1, ISSUE 1, JANUARY 2009        PAGE 8 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NGAI TAHU PROPERTIES LTD V CENTRAL PLAINS WATER 
Richard Budd* 
 
Introduction 
There has been a lot of interest and debate 
over the issue of who has priority since 
certain resources have either approached or 
been deemed to be already at sustainable 
limits. Nowhere is this more evident than in 
the arena of water allocation. The “first in 
line, first in time” principle established in 
Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District 
Council CA 255/96 Richardson P, Keith J, 
Cartwright J. has been criticised by many 
parties as an inefficient mechanism. 
Addressing this issue was one of the 
priorities stated in the “Water Programme of 
Action” initiated by the Labour Government 
in 2003. A new, more efficient method 
would be found, with suggestions that 
“merit” would be a key consideration. The 
report in 2008 from the Water Programme 
of Action committee was strangely silent on 
the matter, strongly suggesting, with 
apologies to Winston Churchill, that while 
“first in line, first in time” may not be 
perfect, it is the best system we have. 
 
The competition being played out for priority 
access to the higher reliability, “A” permit, 
water from the Waimakariri River has 
introduced a new element to the 
consideration of priority access to resources. 
That is the issue of when priority is 
determined. 
 
This article follows the process for 
determining priority through the Courts up 
to the Supreme Court where the matter has 
been heard but a decision is not expected 
until early in 2009. The key sections of the 
RMA 1991 are; Part II s.5, s.21, s.37, s.91, 
s.92, and s.95. 
 
The Applications 
In 2001 Central Plains Water Steering 
Committee (a Joint Committee of Selwyn 
District Council (SDC)/Christchurch City 
Council (CCC) lodged applications with 
Environment Canterbury (ECan) for consent 
to take water from the Waimakariri and 
Rakaia Rivers. The purpose was to pave the 
way for further planning and subsequent 
applications to “use” the water to irrigate 
the scheme south of the Waimakariri River. 
In Dec 2001 ECan informed Central Plains 
Water (CPW) the consent was “notifiable” 
but the process would not proceed until 
subsequent consents were lodged. No “use” 
applications were filed until Nov 2005. 
 
In January and June/July 2005 Ngai Tahu 
Properties Ltd (NTPL) applied for consent to 
“take and use” water from the Waimakariri 
to irrigate land to the North of the river.  
 
The Environment Court 
NTPL applied to the Environment Court 
(EnvC) for a declaration that its application 
was entitled to priority over the CPW 
application. The Court granted a declaration 
in those terms. 
 
The High Court 
Central Plains Water Trust v Ngai Tahu 
Properties Ltd Randerson J, CIV-2006-
409/2116 
 
The Environment Court Decision was upheld 
by the High Court (HC). The HC considered 
the fact that CPW’s application was 
notifiable but was put on hold under section 
91 by ECan, pending the “use” application, 
deprived it of priority, should the latter 
application be notified first. 
The HC determined that priority for 
competing applications is generally decided 
on which one is first ready for notification, 
but circumstances can displace this: 
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 A request for further information under 
s.92; and/or 
 A decision under s.91 to not proceed 
with notification pending further 
applications; or 
 Unreasonable delay by an applicant. 
 
Randerson J granted leave to appeal his 
decision to the Court of Appeal (CA), being 
satisfied that the case raised serious issues 
of general and public importance relevant 
not only to these two parties but to other 
applications for resource consents and to 
Territorial Local Authorities (TLAs) and 
Regional Councils (RCs) dealing with 
competing applications for finite resources. 
 
The Court of Appeal 
Central Plains Water  Trust v Ngai Tahu 
Properties Ltd [2008] NZCA 71.   
Hammond Robertson and Baragwanath J,  
 
Each party accepted the result in Fleetwing 
(to which the CA is bound) to the extent 
that they accept the priority principle. 
Fleetwing addressed the legal test for 
determining priorities for hearing competing 
appeals in the Environment Court. The Court 
“stands in the shoes of the Council” so 
priority must be determined the same way. 
Rather than competing appeals this case 
turns on competing applications to the 
Council. But CPW and NTPL advanced 
competing submissions as to the application 
of the Fleetwing decision. See Fleetwing 
Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council CA 
255/96 Richardson P, Keith J, Cartwright J. 
 
Lords Simon and Diplock in Maunsell v Olins 
[1975] AC 373 at 391 observed that 
statutory language, like all language, is 
capable of an almost infinite graduation of 
“register”. They noted that it is the duty of 
the court to tune in to such register and to 
interpret the statutory language so as to 
give it the primary meaning which is 
appropriate to the register unless it is clear 
that some other meaning must be given to 
achieve the statutory purpose or to avoid 
injustice, anomaly, absurdity or 
contradiction.  
 
The text of the RMA provides no clear 
answer.  Leave to appeal was granted under 
s.144(2) of the Summary Proceedings Act 
1957, imported by s.308 RMA. The 
questions posed by the HC are: 
 
1. Whether the determination of priority 
between competing applications for 
resource consents should be determined 
by which one is ready first for 
notification; 
2. If the answer to (1) is yes whether a 
decision under s.91 of the RMA not to 
proceed with notification means that the 
application is not ready for notification 
until the additional consents are made. 
 
 
The Fleetwing judgement placed significance 
on the legislative timetable 
 S.21 duty to avoid unreasonable delay 
 S.95 notification in 10 working days 
 S.92 10 days further info sought 
 S.37 time extensions 
The CA, having emphasized the time limits 
concluded: 
 Each application is to be determined on 
its own merits. RMA does not allow for 
comparative assessment of competing 
claims. 
 RMA does not provide for the refusal of 
an application on the ground that 
another one might meet a higher 
standard than the Act specifies. 
 
So Fleetwing decided that priority is 
determined on a first come first served 
basis; and each application must be 
considered individually on its merits without 
regard to other applications. Fleetwing did 
not determine at what stage priority is 
achieved. Unless the case is distinguishable, 
only this last point was open for the CA to 
decide.  
 
ECan, 21/12/01 in writing, to CPW advised 
that the “Take” application was notifiable 
without the need for further information. 
However the letter went on to say 
notification would be deferred under s.91 as 
further applications would be required. 
ECan, in August 2004, wrote to CPW 
drawing attention to the substantial delay in 
obtaining the further information sought and 
referring to s.21, the duty to avoid 
unreasonable delay. CPW responded 
(15/10/04) advising that the application was 
to be pursued. ECan (18/03/05) wrote to 
CPW requiring further info by 31/03/05 or it 
would withdraw the application. The 
timeframe was subsequently extended, 
amendments were made to the application 
and the further applications were received 
on 24/11/05. ECan notified all consents, 
satisfied that sufficient information was at 
hand, on 24/06/06. This was 9 months after 
notification and 4 months after the hearing 
of Ngai Tahu’s application. 
Given that priority is to be determined on a 
‘first in line, first in time’ basis, the question 
for the CA was how and at what stage  
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priority is achieved. The CA determined that 
the Courts below (EnvC and HC) took too 
narrow a view. While this issue is to be 
determined by both the text and the 
purpose of the Act (s.5) here the purposive 
approach is critical because there is no solid 
textual answer (See Acts Interpretation Act 
1999). In Northland Milk Vendors 
Association v Northern Milk Ltd [1998]1 
NZLR 530 (CA) Cooke P stated “The Courts 
can in a sense fill gaps in an Act but only to 
make the Act work as Parliament must have 
intended” (at 537). 
 
The CA determined that three points were 
relevant here: 
1. The primary function of promoting 
sustainable management of natural and 
physical resources and reconciling the 
competing values of the RMA (e.g. 
development and protection of the 
natural character of rivers: ss.5(2) and 
(6a)) 
2. The “inclusive and democratic procedure” 
of the RMA 
3. The timetable provisions of the RMA 
 
The CA found in considering these points: 
 
1. The court supports a priority decision in 
favour of CPW. Larger major 
developments should not be trumped by 
later smaller simpler applications that are 
able to be made comprehensively without 
the need to proceed in stages. 
2. The CA determined that the “inclusive 
and democratic procedure” of the RMA 
would be accommodated by conferring 
priority to CPW. It could be different if 
NTPL had no knowledge of CPW but the 
Ngai Tahu collective has two members on 
the CPW Trust. 
3. While s.21 requires the avoidance of 
unreasonable delay and s.95 requires 
notification within 10 working days (and  
 
for s.92) and s.37 allows for extensions 
to double these timeframes, s.91 
provides an explicit dispensation from 
those time limits. 
 
While the timetable regime presumptively 
favours Ngai Tahu, it provides specific 
provision for exceptional cases. Ngai Tahu 
argued that because CPW’s final take 
application and the subsequent use 
applications was lodged after their 
application CPW should lose priority. The CA 
was not of that opinion, determining that 
“This is not an insubstantial or colourable 
application which should in terms of Burr v 
Blenheim Borough Council be brushed aside 
in favour of a later more comprehensive 
application. 
 
The Court (Central Plains Water Trust v Ngai 
Tahu Properties Ltd[2008] NZCA 71) 
therefore found that an application for 
resource consent to take water which is not 
disqualified by unreasonable delay and 
which, although recognizing the need for 
subsequent applications could not be filed, 
takes priority over an application which 
relates to the same resource and which, 
although complete in itself, was filed later 
by a party with knowledge of the earlier 
application. It awarded $10,000 costs plus 
disbursements against NTPL.  
 
The Supreme Court has granted leave to 
Ngai Tahu Property Ltd to appeal against 
this decision Ngai Tahu Property Ltd v 
Central Plains Water Trust 24/06/08, 
SC15/2008, the case has been heard and 
the outcome is awaited. 
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